Nothing Aside

Bin Laden Returns

After 13 months without an public presence, Osama bin Laden has again made an appearance in a tape in which he says that al-Qaeda is winning in Iraq and, oddly, offers a "truce" to the United States.  According to bin Laden, the lack of attacks in the United States is not because of anything we are doing to beef up security, but because they just haven't chosen to attack at this time.  To which I say, "yeah, right."  Terrorists don't sit on operations that could be successful.  The risk of being caught before the attack could be carried out would be too great.  Essentially bin Laden is trying to keep up the appearance that he could order an attack at will.  He would have done so by now (assuming he has any contact with anyone at this point), so we know this argument is nonsense.

On the "truce" comment, again, what is he getting at?  Is it a sign of weakness that he wants the U.S. to leave Iraq and Afghanistan and everything will be just fine and he'll leave us alone?  Does he really think we're that stupid? 

We don't mind offering you a long-term truce on fair conditions that we adhere to. We are a nation that God has forbidden to lie and cheat. So both sides can enjoy security and stability under this truce so we can build Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been destroyed in this war. There is no shame in this solution, which prevents the wasting of billions of dollars that have gone to those with influence and merchants of war in America who have supported Bush's election campaign with billions of dollars -- which lets us understand the insistence by Bush and his gang to carry on with war.

For someone who has in the past said that victory will only come when the "crusaders and zionists" are gone for good, the suggestion of co-existance is totally absurd.  And he should know this much. 

Apparently bin Laden's voice was weaker and less dominant, perhaps as a result of living in the border regions of Pakistan while on dialysis.  One way or another, bin Laden is on the decline.  And that is always a good thing.

#2 Down? Dr. Evil Is Next

ABCNews is reporting that Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's second in command and its most vocal representative these days, may have been killed by a CIA drone in the border region of Pakistan.  Let's hope that these reports turn out to be true.  We haven't seen a video from bin Laden in more than a year and instead have seen al-Zawahiri taking the lead.  No one really knows why this is - bin Laden may be too remote to really lead al-Qaeda, he may be dead, or something else - but it seems that a dead al-Zawahiri would be a boon to the war on terrorism.  Certainly al-Qaeda has moved on to become more than just its leaders, but if the reports of his death prove accurate, this would be a huge step forward against terrorism - unlike our current efforts in the terrorist factory that is Iraq.

**UPDATE**: It seems that we may not have gotten al-Zawahiri.  Drat.  Pakistan of course is declaring its outrage for this attack on Pakistani territory, but they knew this was going on.  Hopefully we'll get him, and bin Laden, next time.

Quick Exit, Foiled

This picture is just too funny to pass up:

After fielding some tough questions at a news conference in Beijing, Bush tried to make a quick exit only to find that his chosen escape route, the big wooden doors to his right, were locked.  He then had to awkwardly field a few more questions before being directed out of the room by his personal aide.  What is with the Bush presidents and awkward moments in Asia (see George H. W. Bush puking on the Japanese prime minister in 1992)?

Good Riddance

It is about time we got out of Uzbekistan.

WASHINGTON Jul 30, 2005 — The Central Asian nation of Uzbekistan has ended its agreement allowing U.S. military aircraft and personnel to use an air base that has been an important hub for American military operations in Afghanistan, administration officials said Saturday.
...

K2 has been a critical staging point for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan since the earliest days of the war, which began in October 2001.

More recently, the base has been used to move supplies, including humanitarian aid, into northern Afghanistan. It also is a refueling point for transport planes.

The eviction notice came just days after Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld returned from a Central Asia visit to two Uzbek neighboring states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Officials in Kyrgyzstan affirmed to Rumsfeld that U.S. forces can continue to use Manas air base for as long as the Afghan war requires.

I don't know all the benefits of having bases in Uzbekistan versus Kyrgyzstan, but it seems like if we don't have to play nice with Islam Karimov we are coming out ahead on this.  Especially after the massacre in Andijan in May, it is clear that the Uzbek leader is no ideological friend of the United States.  If we can clarify our stance on democracy and human rights by cutting our ties with a brutal dictator, I am all for it.

Uzbekistan's ties with Washington have deteriorated after the Bush administration joined other Western nations in urging an international investigation into the suppression of a May uprising in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan.

Uzbek government troops fired on protesters in the city after militants seized a prison and a government building. Authorities denied that troops fired on unarmed civilians and said that 187 people died in the unrest; human rights groups put the figure as high as 750.

Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, who has ruled for 16 years and tolerates no dissent, has blamed the violence on Islamic militants.

He has rejected the demands for an outside inquiry, and, facing Western criticism, has found a strong support in Russia and China. Both of them are wary about the U.S. military presence in the strategic and resource-rich region.

Russia and China can have Karimov.  It will just clarify even more who cares about freedom and who mocks it with a heavy hand.

Do As I Say, Not As I Do

I'm going to say this once, and only once, so listen up: I agree with John Bolton. 

Today the Bush administration made a deal with the government of India to share some sensitive American nuclear technology with India in exchange for a pledge by PM Singh to step up efforts to combat proliferation.  Huh?  This is proliferation.  It not only doesn't make it O.K. just because the proliferation is our own doing, but it undercuts our efforts to control the nuclear development of dangerous countries like Iran and North Korea.  Bolton and I agree on this point: by rewarding India, which developed its nuclear program in secret, with an nice prize like this, we severely undercut our credibility elsewhere.

President Bush agreed yesterday to share civilian nuclear technology with India, reversing decades of U.S. policies designed to discourage countries from developing nuclear weapons.

The agreement between Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, which must win the approval of Congress, would create a major exception to the U.S. prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that doesn't accept international monitoring of all of its nuclear facilities. India has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which requires such oversight, and conducted its first nuclear detonation in 1974.

Participants in the discussions said there had been debate within the administration about whether the deal with India -- which built its atomic arsenal in secret -- would undercut U.S. efforts to confront Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs. There were also concerns about how the agreement would be accepted in Pakistan, India's regional rival and an ally in the U.S. campaign against al Qaeda.

I understand the rationale for this: China is a rising power that will need balancing and India is a behemoth with the manpower, if not yet the might, to help us control a surging China.  Additionally, our alliance with Pakistan is at best temporary.  We will want - need - India on our side if something is to be done (militarily or otherwise) about Pakistan's continued culture of extremism.  It is becoming increasingly clear that Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia, is a top playground for terrorists.  Our support for Musharraf is only a temporary stop-gap on the horrible leak of extremism coming out of Pakistan.

But regardless of all the longer-term reasons for making this deal with India, it sets a horrible precedent for other nations. 

The White House faces two major hurdles to put the deal into effect. One is altering rules in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a consortium of more than 40 countries that controls export of nuclear technology. The group has been unreceptive to previous Bush administration initiatives and will be reluctant to create country-specific rules, said George Perkovich, a nuclear specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The other challenge will be persuading Congress to change the U.S. Nonproliferation Act, which prevents sales of sensitive nuclear technology to countries that refuse monitoring of nuclear facilities.

Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) condemned the agreement as a "dangerous proposition and bad nonproliferation policy" and said he will introduce legislation to block it. "We cannot play favorites, breaking the rules of the nonproliferation treaty, to favor one nation at the risk of undermining critical international treaties on nuclear weapons," he said in a statement. "What will Russia say when they want to supply more nuclear materials or technology to Iran? You can be sure that Pakistan will demand equal treatment."

And that's the problem.  It tells Russia that we're really just kidding when we say they need to stop supplying Iran with nuclear technology.  It tells Iran and North Korea that if you're able to get into the nuclear club secretly, good things await you on the other side.  It tells Pakistan that they'll always be #2 as far as its conflict with India is concerned (not that there's anything wrong with this - it's just not something we should officially be saying).  On the whole, this is just a bad agreement. 

If it is a sign of our strengthening ties or of our generosity in helping the Indian economic surge help us instead of hurt us, it seems we could have made a gesture in a less policy-undermining way - like with a rare official dinner or a visit to the Crawford ranch.

What To Do About Pyongyang

My strength is not North Korean policy by any measure, but I'm willing to take a stab at it here.  It seems to me that Pyongyang has one very simple goal: regime survival.  Knowing that, everything else follows suit - including the totalitarian attitude towards the North Korean people, the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the childish pride issues (suddenly there's a breakthrough in talks when Bush slips up and calls Kim Jung Il "Mister").

With our attention completely locked on Iraq and our military manpower limited for the next several years, our military capability against North Korea amounts to a large collection of large-scale bombers based in the region.  This is an option that simply isn't feasible.  It would be a decent, yet horrific response to any aggressive action by Pyongyang, but it is not our best option for getting Kim Jung Il to change his behavior. 

All other options rely heavily on the cooperation of South Korea and China.  Unfortunately, they seem to have no inclination to be tough with their ethnic brethren and communist cronies, respectively.  This leaves us in a tough spot, but one that can be brought to a decent conclusion with some devoted diplomacy.  G. John Ikenberry has more:

The United States has an interest in relieving North Korea of its nuclear programs – but Pyongyang has an interest in regime survival. Right now, nuclear weapons look like the best ticket available for North Korea to stay in business. We call it deterrence. Bush's invasion of Iraq and doctrine of preventive war have made nuclear weapons more rather than less valuable for North Korea as well as for other countries that think they are in the gunsight of the White House. As I argued in an earlier post: "Nuclear deterrence is perhaps the ultimate protection against a unipolar state that speaks openly about solving its security problems through regime change." The Bush administration has got to find a way to alter the underlying logic of this situation. Those who reject direct engagement and deal making with Pyongyang offer three alternative strategies. One is the Iraq strategy – use of preventive force and regime change. Most serious analysts think this is no longer an option. A second option is to embargo and squeeze North Korea – but other countries (most importantly, South Korea) are not willing to cooperate with Washington and, in any event, may experts think it will not generate the desired regime collapse or policy reversal. The third option is to rely on China to pull North Korea back from the nuclear brink. But this strategy has been pursued from several years now with no visible results. It is not even clear that Beijing is totally unhappy with a nuclear North Korea. The Cheney-Bolton anti-engagement faction doesn't have a credible or workable alternative – all they have is the ability to block the engagement faction. Round and round we go and the nuclear programs in Pyongyang inch forward.

It's time for diplomacy to get its day in the sun.  The Cheney-Bolton bloc is not producing results.  It is only giving Pyongyang more time to stall on negotiations as it gets, as Rodney Dangerfield would say "no respect!"  Meanwhile, their stockpile of nuclear weapons grows.

Should We Worry About China's Nukes?

I wandered over to Arts & Letters Daily and found this great article about the apparent myth perpetrated by the Bush administration that China is in the process of building up its non-conventional weaponry.  It simply isn't true.  In fact, it appears that China holds one of, if not the smallest nuclear arsenals of any nuclear power.  Their missile programs, in this area at least, have not changed in the past few decades according to American intelligence sources.

Chinese nuclear forces today look remarkably like they have for decades. The picture of the Chinese nuclear arsenal that emerges from U.S. intelligence assessments suggests a country that--at least in the nuclear field--is deploying a smaller, less ready arsenal than is within its capabilities. That reflects a choice to rely on a minimum deterrent that sacrifices offensive capability in exchange for maximizing political control and minimizing economic cost--a decision that seems eminently sensible. The great mystery is not that Beijing chose such an arsenal, but that the Bush administration would be eager to change it.

The political issue here is that a number of Congressional Republicans just don't want to believe that China isn't on the move in this respect.  It's like they want a nuclear arms race with China so they can justify the gigantic waste of money known as the missile defense "shield."

The true scope of China's nuclear capabilities are hidden in plain sight, among the myriad declassified assessments produced by the U.S. intelligence community. Yet, such analyses have run afoul of conservative legislators, who express dismay when threat assessments don't conform to their perceptions of reality. Congressional Republicans, for instance, in 2000 created the China Futures Panel, chaired by former Gen. John Tilelli, to examine charges of bias in the CIA assessments of China. In 2002, Bob Schaffer, a Republican congressman from Colorado, complained about the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of foreign ballistic missile development in a letter to CIA director George Tenet: "The lack of attention to the pronounced and growing danger caused by China's ballistic missile buildup, and its aggressive strategy for using its ballistic missiles cannot go unchallenged. The report is misleading, and, because it understates the magnitude of threat, is profoundly dangerous."

Yet another case of reality and fiction colliding and Republicans choosing the fiction and running with it.

POSTSCRIPT: This article speculates that China has "only" 200-400 nuclear warheads.  The fact that that is considered a small amount is not what surprises me since I'm well aware that the United States has many, many times that amount.  My question is, practically, how many could ever be used, even in a full-blown nuclear holocaust?  At some point beyond, oh, I don't know, 200-400, it would seem like you'd run out of targets.  Now, I'm not one to suggest that the United States should cut back on its arsenal, but it seems like China is playing its cards pretty smartly here: they are avoiding a costly nuclear arms race with the United States and are keeping a minimum arsenal.  Or should I say, the maximum practical arsenal?

Dissent in Today's China

There is rarely a lot of good political news coming out of China these days, especially with the anniversary of the pro-democracy Tienanmen Square protest and subsequent brutal suppression.  But maybe opposition to the Communist regime needs to happen with a more subtle finesse.  A recent we-aren't-going-to-take-this protest by hard working elderly peasants may signal the way to show dissent in authoritarian China today.

HUAXI, China -- A hard rain had fallen most of the night. Xu Juxian, a wiry farmer's wife with straggly black hair, said the downpour leaked copiously into the ragged tents where elderly protesters had been camping for more than two weeks. As a result, recalled Xu, they were all damp, uncomfortable and wide awake in the still hour just before dawn.

So Xu, 79, and the others immediately heard the commotion when dozens of government cars and buses wound into Huaxi beginning at 4:30 a.m. on April 10, carrying an estimated 3,000 policemen and civilians assigned to destroy the tents. To alert people in this gritty farm town that police were pouring in, watchful residents set off fireworks by the hundreds.

By the time dawn broke, up to 20,000 peasants from the half-dozen villages that make up Huaxi township had responded to the alarm, participants recounted, and they were in no mood to bow to authority. For four years, they had been complaining that industrial pollution was poisoning the land, stunting the crops and fouling the water in their fertile valley surrounded by forested hills 120 miles south of Hangzhou. And now their protest -- blocking the entrance to an industrial park -- was being put down by force.

A pitched battle erupted that soggy morning between enraged farmers and badly outnumbered police. By the end of the day, high-ranking officials had fled in their black sedans and hundreds of policemen had scattered in panic while farmers destroyed their vehicles. It was a rare triumph for the peasants, rising up against the all-powerful Communist Party government.

Read the whole profile in the Washington Post.  While this incident didn't make a huge splash, it may show the way for dissent in China.

Why Pyongyang's Test Will Be Self-Destructive

The regime of Kim Jung Il in Pyongyang has always put pride above pragmatism.  That is nothing new.  Negotiations are always hung up on what the North Koreans think we think of them.  Rarely does North Korea act based on what would actually be in its best interest.  We see this once again in the imminent nuclear test that Pyongyang is itching to spring on the international community.  Most dramatically, such a test would be about announcing to the world - but mostly the United States - that North Korea is a state that should not be messed with and which demands the respect of its adversaries. 

But there are real consequences to a North Korean nuclear test.  Practically, where could they carry out this test?  Unlike the United States, India and Pakistan which have large deserts upon which they can test such weapons with relatively little environmental damage, North Korea has no such areas.  The place where American intelligence satellites have identified a potential test site may be remote, but a test at that location could be disastrous for not only the North Korean environment, but its already bad off population, as well as South Koreans and others in the region. 

Satoshi Morimoto of Takushoku University in Japan raised a new concern that many have overlooked in the crisis:

[C]arrying out nuclear tests inside North Korea would be an extremely sticky action. That is because this kind of nuclear testing could only be carried out underground. There is absolutely no way they could do [it] in the air or above ground. Even with underground nuclear testing, you normally need a fifty to sixty kilometer square of desert for a nuclear test. In the U.S., this would be something like the Nevada desert. Unless you have the kind they have in India or Pakistan, you cannot do it. The reason for this is that the underground water system gets damaged. North Korea has a very abundant flow of underground water, and if you carry out an underground nuclear test in this kind of place, radioactive materials would get into the water supply for the whole of the Korean peninsula, and also flow out into the Sea of Japan. As a consequence, if there were any underground nuclear testing in the Korean peninsula, it would not be just the ecological system, but also the topography of the land that would be damaged.

A test could be disastrous for the Korean peninsula and could have effects on the population similar to the after effects of an intentional radiological release - except Pyongyang would not be prepared for them because they see the test as a show of defiance, potential deterrence and pride, not necessarily as a destructive force per se.  Yes, a nuclear North Korea would be horrible, but the announcement of a nuclear North Korea could be (self-)destructive enough on its own.

Tsunami Aid in Four Hours

There has been some chatter in the past few days about the apparent lack of aid money from the United States for the victims of the Tsunami in Southeast Asia.  The latest total that I heard put the American donation at around $35 million, but with the likely possibility of more aid at a later time.  I hope that such an amount is indeed only a starter, because the United States is certainly capable of being a leader in the disaster relief.  From DemocracyNow.org comes a somewhat cynical view on what $35 million means in relation to a few other priorities for the Bush administration.

On Monday, the Bush administration pledged an initial $15 million for the effort. After a top UN official described the donation as "stingy", the US pledged another $20 million bringing the total offering to $35 million.

To put the figure in perspective, President Bush plans to spend between $30 and $40 million for his upcoming inauguration celebration.

And the amount pledged to victims of the tsunami is dwarfed by the Bush administration's war effort in Iraq.

The U.S. has spent an average of $9.5 million every hour on the war and occupation of Iraq. With a current price tag of $147 billion, the U.S. has spent n average of about $228 million a day in Iraq. In other words, the U.S. spends what it promised on the tsunami relief effort in less than four hours in Iraq.

I tend to disagree with the tone of the rebuke, but it provides a few interesting factoids nevertheless.  The inauguration complain is undeniable, but ultimately it fails under the partisan test: would they make the inauguration comparison if a Democrat were in office?  Afterall, Clinton's 1996 inauguration wasted a full $33 million.  It is the inauguration itself which is the problem, not the candidate (at least in this case).

The Iraq comparison is illuminating.  Four hours of the cash we put into Iraq would equal our whole effort to help the millions left homeless in Southeast Asia.  Of course there are budget issues and bureaucratic necessities of which to be aware, but it is a striking contrast.  70,000 people are killed in a matter of days and that is the best we can do? 

I hope more aid is on the way.  America should be leading.