My strength is not North Korean policy by any measure, but I'm willing to take a stab at it here. It seems to me that Pyongyang has one very simple goal: regime survival. Knowing that, everything else follows suit - including the totalitarian attitude towards the North Korean people, the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the childish pride issues (suddenly there's a breakthrough in talks when Bush slips up and calls Kim Jung Il "Mister").
With our attention completely locked on Iraq and our military manpower limited for the next several years, our military capability against North Korea amounts to a large collection of large-scale bombers based in the region. This is an option that simply isn't feasible. It would be a decent, yet horrific response to any aggressive action by Pyongyang, but it is not our best option for getting Kim Jung Il to change his behavior.
All other options rely heavily on the cooperation of South Korea and China. Unfortunately, they seem to have no inclination to be tough with their ethnic brethren and communist cronies, respectively. This leaves us in a tough spot, but one that can be brought to a decent conclusion with some devoted diplomacy. G. John Ikenberry has more:
The United States has an interest in relieving North Korea of its nuclear programs – but Pyongyang has an interest in regime survival. Right now, nuclear weapons look like the best ticket available for North Korea to stay in business. We call it deterrence. Bush's invasion of Iraq and doctrine of preventive war have made nuclear weapons more rather than less valuable for North Korea as well as for other countries that think they are in the gunsight of the White House. As I argued in an earlier post: "Nuclear deterrence is perhaps the ultimate protection against a unipolar state that speaks openly about solving its security problems through regime change." The Bush administration has got to find a way to alter the underlying logic of this situation. Those who reject direct engagement and deal making with Pyongyang offer three alternative strategies. One is the Iraq strategy – use of preventive force and regime change. Most serious analysts think this is no longer an option. A second option is to embargo and squeeze North Korea – but other countries (most importantly, South Korea) are not willing to cooperate with Washington and, in any event, may experts think it will not generate the desired regime collapse or policy reversal. The third option is to rely on China to pull North Korea back from the nuclear brink. But this strategy has been pursued from several years now with no visible results. It is not even clear that Beijing is totally unhappy with a nuclear North Korea. The Cheney-Bolton anti-engagement faction doesn't have a credible or workable alternative – all they have is the ability to block the engagement faction. Round and round we go and the nuclear programs in Pyongyang inch forward.
It's time for diplomacy to get its day in the sun. The Cheney-Bolton bloc is not producing results. It is only giving Pyongyang more time to stall on negotiations as it gets, as Rodney Dangerfield would say "no respect!" Meanwhile, their stockpile of nuclear weapons grows.
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